Clausewitz famously said, “War is the continuation of policy by other means.”[1] The first century of Germany’s history as a unified state was dominated by the policy. The period lasted from the wars of unification under Bismarck until the Third Reich lay in ruins under the combined military forces in World War II. The period following the Second World War was marked by a shift towards pacifism in West Germany that lasted until they were united with East Germany. After the reunification, Germany again began to deploy military forces outside the boundaries of Germany, albeit solely under the auspices of the United Nations. This paper will examine the politics of German military doctrine during unification, after the Second World War, and today.
I. How a thirst for war was bred into a National Consciousness
For most of recorded history the geographical area encompassed by modern day Germany was occupied by an amalgamation of independent nation-states. For much of the medieval time period it was under the aegis of the Holy Roman Empire. During this period the borders were constantly shifting and the various states maintained a great deal of autonomy. In addition, the Holy Roman Empire covered an area much larger than the land comprising modern day Germany.
The struggle for political control over this area was between two countries. The first was Austria, a large Germanic speaking country trying to preserve the status quo. The second was Prussia, the smaller but more aggressive in terms of seeking unification. After the final dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire they battled for prominence among and dominance over the remaining German speaking nation-states. Their struggle was often influenced by outside factors such as the various wars that involved numerous European nations.
It was the Napoleonic wars that provided the motivation for Prussia to begin aggressively seeking a large, unified German speaking state under their leadership. The successes of Napoleon’s armies against the Prussians led to a series of reforms intended to avoid such a national embarrassment reoccurring. This led to the development of a professional officer corps known as the Junkers. It also led to a standing, better trained, and better equipped, more competent army.
It is a historical truism that standing armies must be used to be justified to the populace. Prussia proved adept at using their army to move towards unification while Austria adopted a more passive stance. The presence of large numbers of non-Germanic peoples in Austria led to a rising tide of German nationalism in Prussia and several of the smaller nation-states comprising the German Confederation. However, political pressures from Austria and Russia led to set-backs in the development of a unified German State.
The Humiliation of Olmütz was the premier example.[2] Russia and Austria were frightened by the rising power of Prussia. Together they pressured Prussia into accepting the treaty which demilitarized Prussia and admitted to Austrian dominance of the German Confederation. Due to internal dissensions among various ethnic groups, Austria had no interest in forming a unified, Germanic speaking state and believed it was in their best interest to prevent Prussia from forming such a state.
Prussia, however, was still extremely interested in unifying the German Confederation under the Prussian banner, and when Otto Von Bismarck came to power they found a leader capable of making it happen. Bismarck was a talented politician who utilized the philosophy of the realpolitik, the idea that nations with similar ideologies were less useful as allies than nations that served the national self-interest.[3] Bismarck tended to believe Germany was a specific area of land rather than a grouping of languages. This led to his success in unifying Germany primarily through militaristic means by using unconventional allies against other Germanic speaking nations when it suited his purposes.
It began with Denmark. When the king of Denmark died, the question of succession to the throne led to an opening which Bismarck was swift to seize. Although he knew his ultimate enemy was Austria, he temporarily allied Prussia with Austria in order to “settle” the Denmark question. The final settlement of the question led to new land being jointly ruled by Austria and Prussia. Ultimately, this land would become part of a new Germany unified under Prussian control.[4] Thus, from the beginning of Prussia’s rise to power, it was done on the strength of military might.
The expansion continued in the same vain. Austria was the next target. Though both Austria and Prussia were members of the German Confederation, for Bismarck to attain his goals he needed to remove Austria from its role as one of the two dominant powers in the Confederation. Again he turned to the realpolitik.
The Confederation had always stood as one entity against the world, emphasizing their German language as the unifying factor. Bismarck changed that by allying with Italy against a fellow German speaking member of the Confederation, Austria. He promised Italy the territory of Venetia in exchange for an alliance against the more powerful Austria. He then used the Confederation Diet to provoke a war between Austria and Prussia. His representative in the Diet proposed changes that would have radically altered the politically favored status of Austria within the Confederation. Naturally, Austria took offense and shortly war broke out between Austria and Prussia in the west and Austria and Italy in the East.[5] Bismarck planned it so cleverly that Austria was perceived to have started the war, just as Denmark had been considered the instigator.
The Six Weeks War[6] was a complete victory for the Prussians. It was so dominating that Bismarck had to convince his primary general, Moltke, to restrain his successes lest Austria be hurt so badly she would ally against Prussia.[7] He was already planning the next phase of his expansion which would require the assitance of Austria. The populace, meanwhile, was giddy over the military success of their growing nation and the world believed each time Prussia was merely a participant, not the instigator of each war.
With Denmarck and Austria pacified Bismarck turned his attentions to France. Again, his aims of unification of Germany could not be attained peacefully so he turned to instigating a war. As per his pattern, he manipulated events in such a way that France was perceived as the aggressor. For a third time in less than a decade, Prussia entered a war that resulted in territorial gains and this time the unification of Germany was complete. It took less than ten years for Bismarck to use cleverly crafted alliances to garner territory-gaining military victories against Denmarck, Austria, and France in turn, and in each case Prussia appeared to be defending herself against outside aggression.
Thus the path of Germany from the time the Holy Roman Empire dissolved until Germany was unified under Bismarck, war was a constant companion and always successful. The people of Germany grew used to success in warfare and took the lessons of realpolitik to heart. The militarism of Germany became part of the German volksgeist[8]and that idea would continue to be part of their national character.
It is vital to understand the aforementioned process. German citizens realized their nation had been formed through militaristic action. The Clauswitz belief that “War is a continuation of policy by other means”[9] was invoked in their schools, in national holidays, and in the very culture of the country. Germany took to heart the use of violence as the means to their goals without recognizing the restraint, such as demonstrated against Austria, that made effective the ideology of Bismarck’s realpolitik. The key example would be the events surrounding the beginning of World War I.
When world events moved towards war after the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand in 1914, the famous “Blank Check”[10] was later used as evidence that Germany had deliberately instigated the war in an attempt to expand yet again as she had done under Bismarck. This was in keeping with moves Bismarck had made in unifying war. He repeatedly was able to lead other nations into declaring war on Prussia which allowed Germany to appear guiltless in starting wars that ended in German territorial gains.
Considering the German philosophy towards war, this was not an unreasonable assumption. The collapse of the German military at the conclusion of World War I was a serious blow to national pride. They had wrapped a great deal of their national identity up in the unbroken chain of stupendous military success they had experienced ever since the break-up of the Holy Roman Empire.
As a result, the myth of the “Stab in the Back” quickly gained prominence. The German people, unwilling to believe they had been defeated on the field of battle, began to seek an alternate explanation for Germany’s loss. Thus it became commonly believed that the politicians had capitulated at a time when the military forces were winning the war on the battlefield. Thus, they had “stabbed the military in the back”[11] and the myth of German military invincibility continued in the hearts and minds of the German populace.
The Weimar Republic operated without taking into account the principle of National pride in military success. Whereas under Bismarck and his disciples, Germany would have created alliances and reconstructed a strong military in their attempt to restablish German pride, power and prestige, the Weimar Republic sought more peaceful means. When Hitler and the Nazis began proclaiming a militant message, it marked a return of the source of national pride the Germans were familiar with. Using the myth of the Stab in the Back to explain away their defeat in World War I, Germany was ready to move towards another conflict, and their eagerness was further substantiated by the end of the Depression and improvement in their economic situation that coincided with the reestablishment of the German military. With their economy booming and their leader demonstrating an aptitude for forming a powerful military, the peoplr were enthusiastic about their imminent return to glorious warfare.
Whereas scholars are at odds over whether Germany was actually responsible for initiating World War I or were simply saddled with the blame by vindictive victors, the blame has traditionally been layed at Germany’s feet, in large part due to past history and the War Guilt clause of the Versailles Treaty. World War II had much clearer origins. Hitler’s Germany was very aggressive in expanding and kept annexing or invading smaller nations until a general war broke out.
The road to war began to fast track in 1935. Contrary to provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, Hitler announced plans to rebuild a 550,000 man army. When Europe failed to react, the stage was set for futher German aggression. Hitler’s next bold move was towards France.
France and Germany had a long history of conflict over Alsace-Lorraine and the Rhineland. One measure of prevention France insisted on at the Treaty of Versailles was the demilitarization of the Rhineland to act as a buffer between Germany and France. In 1936, Hitler violated the treaty by marching troops into the Rhineland. When Europe failed to react, the mood of Germany could hardly have been more jubilant.
Here was the type of bold move their nation had been founded on. It instilled a belief that once more Germany would be a force to be reckoned with on the international stage. The shame of the “Stab in the Back” would be removed and Germany would again have a strong military. “Hitler solemnly promised: "First, we swear to yield to no force whatever in the restoration of the honor of our people, preferring to succumb with honor to the severest hardships rather than to capitulate.”[12] His statement aptly reflected the historical German volksgeist. The people were so inspired that 98% approved a referendum approving the reoccupation of the Rhineland. While it is virtually certain those numbers were artificially high due to Nazi polling tactics, there unquestionably were great numbers of supporters of the aggressive German policies.
Germany continued to act belligerently. Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Slovakia were all annexed. When none of these actions provoked the war Hitler sought so desperately, he invaded Poland. This, finally, was the step needed to start the Second World War. Unlike World War I, there was no question from beginning to end of responsibility. Germany sought and got their war.
This time the Allies would not allow another myth of German military success and political betrayal to persist. There was no surrender available for Germany at the conclusion of the war. As the German military fell apart in the field, the allies drove ruthlessly into Berlin. It was clear to all that Germany had no chance of victory in the field. They were not given an opportunity to surrender; this time the Allies would make sure the Germans knew they had been conquered.
After the war a weary Europe looked at a Germany founded on warfare and generally believed guilty of starting the two deadliest, costliest wars experienced in many, many centuries. This idea of Germany as an aggressor nation was a key point during the post-war Nuremburg Trials. One charge against virtually every defendant was a “Crime against peace including planning, preparing, starting, or waging aggressive war.”[13]
Other political considerations, such as the developing Cold War between the forces of Communism and Capitalism, led to the bifurcation of Germany. West Germany was the more independent of the two and will be the focus of the next section of this paper, which examines the shift in national temperament from aggressive, militaristic nation to what some people regard as too pacifistic.
II. West Germany after World War II; How the Military became a non-entity
Fresh off a crushing military defeat that was exacerbated by the collective national guilt of the Holocaust, the communal national guilt over the expelling of huge numbers of German citizens during and after the war, the shared guilt of having pushed for an aggressive war that led to unprecedented destruction, and perhaps also influenced by the destruction Germany itself had seen firsthand,[14] West Germany actively sought a restructuring of the national ideals about war.
In order to prevent a reoccurrence of aggression, Germany included stringent restrictions on warfare in their Basic Law. Article 26 stated, “(1) Acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression, shall be unconstitutional. They shall be made a criminal offense.
(2) Weapons designed for warfare may be manufactured, transported, or marketed only with the permission of the Federal Government. Details shall be regulated by a federal law.”[15] With these restrictions in place, it would be very difficult for German officials to prepare for a war outside of Germany’s borders. With the severe penalties from the Nuremburg trials fresh in their minds, these restrictions were more effective than even the text would suggest. No politician would dare make moves that might lead to a German war of aggression.
Article 115A further restricted the military. The conditions for admitting to a state of war were so inflexible that it is quite likely Germany could have been overrun militarily before the legal apparatus of the Federal Government could have allowed a military response. The strictures emplaced to ensure no reoccurrence of German aggression would or could occur were so effective that from the end of World War II in 1945 until the German deployment to Kosovo in 1999 German troops were never deployed outside the borders of Germany.
In other words, the combination of world fears of German aggression and the collective guilty conscience of the German nation over two devastating wars of aggression and various crimes against humanity committed within the context of those wars led to strict controls on when, how, and if German troops could be deployed. Germany had been transformed from a warlike nation to a nation so pacifistic that her protectors complained and began demanding Germany provide troops to the United Nations. That would take some time to become reality.
III. The Politics of Peace Keeping
German military deployment never occurred under the bifurcated Germany. Only after East and West Germany reunified did it become a possibility. Until the fall of the Soviet bloc, the Cold War meant West Germany was a key point for NATO to stage troops in a buffer zone to prevent Communist forces from reaching the rest of Europe. As a result, Germany had neither the resources nor the need to be active militarily.
When the Cold War ended and reunification began, the need for Germany to act as a buffer began to change. Instead, Germany began trying to find their place as an active participant in Europe particularly and the world in general. As one of the largest countries in the world, they were looked to for contributions to the United Nations. At first, these contributions were solely monetary.
However, as their power grew, the reunified German states began to desire more influence on the United Nations Security Council. Their financial expenditures grew until only the United States and Japan contributed more. At that point the only maneuver Germany had left to demonstrate their participation in the United Nations was to begin deploying troops outside their borders. This first happened in 1999.
The United Nations was on a mission to Yugoslavia. Famously, German troops participated and, to this day, are engaged in Kosovo.[16] Once they began redeploying Germany became very active militarily once more. As of April, they had over 2500 troops, the third largest United Nations contingent[17], in 6 separate countries; Sudan, Liberia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Georgia, Afghanistan and Kosovo[18]. Today, Germany takes pride in their active role as part of the United Nations peacekeeping missions, even stating on their official website, “Hence, also in personnel, Germany is one of the biggest contributors to UN mandated peacekeeping missions.”[19] Some Germans claim they are the second largest supplier of troops to U.N. Peacekeeping missions.[20]
The new German military activism can be traced to a German philosophy in the need for multilateralism. The idea that international actions should be a key factor in international relations was a growing force in the 1980s and 1990s.[21] Under the umbrella of the United Nations, German foreign policy has found a justification and cause that not just permit but demand active military participation in peacekeeping missions.
In a speech to the United Nations, German foreign policy aims were made clear. In striving for peace, the German foreign policy hinges on multilateral approaches that, in turn, rely on active participation by the members of the United Nations.[22]
This demonstrates conclusively that once Germany was reunited and the Cold War was ended, German national interests and foreign relations philosophy once again began to turn outward. Bolstered by their belief in the power and necessity of multilateral action, it was only natural that Germany should turn to action via the United Nations. Article 51 of the United Nations charter[23] became the key portion in leading to German military involvement. When Germany became more active on the world stage their role in the United Nations continued to expand. Additionally, pressure began to be applied from outside German borders for Germany to become active militarily. This pressure came both from individual countries, such as demands by President Bush of the United States, and also through requests for more active involvement from the United Nations itself under the two most recent Presidents of the United Nations.[24]
ConclusionThus it is clear that Germany developed with a political philosophy of being an aggressive, war-like nation, carried the blame for two large and devastating wars in the 20th Century, became an overtly politically pacifist nation, and now has come full circle to where, under the role of United Nations member, Germany is once more very active militarily although solely as part of large, multi-lateral forces. Politically speaking, this was made possible by a changing world philosophy towards Germany by her former enemies and by Germany after the Cold War ended and numerous trouble spots developed
[1] http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd60/60op2.htm, accessed 6/1/06
[2] http://xenohistorian.faithweb.com/europe/eu13.html#Berlin, accessed 5/22/06
[3] http://everything2.com/index.pl?node=Otto%20von%20Bismarck, accessed 5/2/06, and http://everything2.com/index.pl?node=Realpolitik, accessed 5/2/06
[4] http://www.age-of-the-sage.org/history/german_unification.html, accessed 4/28/06
[5] http://www.age-of-the-sage.org/history/german_unification.html, accessed 5/5/06
[6] Sometimes it is referred to as the Seven Weeks War; both names refer to the 1866 conflict between Austria and Prussia in the West and Italy and Austria in the East, both of which ended in crushing defeats for the Austrians.
[7] http://history.hanover.edu/texts/bis.htm, accessed 5/7/06
[8] http://etext.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv4-66, accessed 6/10/06
[9] http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/04spring/fleming.htm, accessed 5/25/06
[10] http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914/blankche.html, accessed 6/2/06
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwone/war_end_04.shtml, accessed 5/15/06
[11] http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwone/war_end_04.shtml, accessed 5/15/06
[12] http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/triumph/tr-rhine.htm, accessed 5/12/06
[13] http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/timeline/ww2time.htm, accessed 5/8/06
[14] The bombing of Dresden approached Hiroshima for the sheer devastation caused by the famed bombing raid.
[15] http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm#26, accessed 6/1/06
[16] http://www.thenation.com/doc/20040719/hockenos, accessed 5/27/06
[17] http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/apr06_1.pdf, accessed 6/5/06 it is interesting to note it is the united Nations website that counts the Germans as the third largest contributor. Later in the paper it will be shown Germany claims to have the second largest number of troops deployed.
[18] http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp, accessed 6/5/06 Followed links to each mission to ascertain German deployments.; also, http://www.germany-un.org/peace/keeping/keeping.html, accessed 6/5/06
[19] http://www.germany-un.org/peace/keeping/keeping.html, accessed 6/5/06
[20] http://www.thenation.com/doc/20040719/hockenos, accessed 5/27/06
[21] http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/reden/2002/020319-50thAnniversaryGermanUNAssociation.html, accessed 6/6/06
http://www.photius.com/countries/germany/government/germany_government_united_nations.html
[22] http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/reden/2002/020319-50thAnniversaryGermanUNAssociation.html, accessed 6/6/06
[23] http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/bt-un51.htm, accessed 6/7/06
[24] http://www.photius.com/countries/germany/government/germany_government_united_nations.html, accessed 6/2/06
4 years ago
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